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**THE CLASH OF INTEGRATION?
RECASTING THE EUROPEAN UNION BARGAIN**

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Introduction

The concept of integration has become increasingly problematic in recent years. This paper posits that there are several integrations – there are several meanings of the term integration. Questions are arising regarding how that term ‘integration’ can be usefully applied to contemporary developments within the European Union (EU). There are reservations regarding the usefulness of the term ‘integration’ as a conceptual tool of analysis. What is the nature of this clash of integrations?

A first problem is that integration has become a *term* conflated to mean almost any process within the European Union (EU) - to the extent that it is no longer clear what integration might mean. Recently, a salient call to commence a fresh debate on integration was made, given that it is difficult to conclude that the ever-increasing complexity of the institutional arrangements, extensive enlargement, the Europeanisation of social, political and cultural domains can be captured by the term integration (Murray and Rumford, 2003, forthcoming).

A further difficulty is that the term integration not only refers to process, but also to concept; objective; theory and model (Murray, 2000; Rumford and Murray, 2003, forthcoming). While there has been considerable academic output on understanding integration as a type of governance in the case of the EU, or even as leading to polity and polity-building (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter and Streek, 1996, Laffan 1997), nevertheless there are reasons for considerable unease, given integration is misunderstood. The emphasis on the enlargement of both EU membership and the scope of EU activities has not led to a new critical awareness of the outcomes and characteristics of the integration process – and its theoretical capacities (Murray 1999, 2000).

Further, an element of teleology is often evident in governance and particularly polity debates. Does integration then lead to polity? (Murray 1999, 2000). Successive developments in the European Community (EC) and EU since the 1950s, such as

enlargement of its membership, extension of the scope of its activities and the Europeanisation of public power and policy, all have contributed to the development of a sophisticated system of governance. This system has been consolidated by the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. Increasingly, it is being suggested that the EU is now in a position to play a role of a polity or government - a role that is traditionally ascribed to the nation state.

One possible reason for confusion and a lack of consensus regarding integration, then, is the very fact that many normative accounts regarded the European Integration (EI) process as having an ultimate end goal of political union. This has often been interpreted as polity, as expressed in accounts that were biased in favour of continued advances in integration and deterministic goals. Debates on polity and EU objectives often contain a set of assumptions, not always explicit. European integration analysis is thus dealing not only with moving targets but also with concepts expressed in teleological terms, which may express a desire for an advance towards an undefined end point of integration. It is imperative that social scientists do not feel tempted to conflate, or inflate, the present EU, to the status of a polity without at least carrying out a methodologically sound endeavour at clarifying meanings of integration.

An additional challenge is that the EU, like the process of integration, changes over time as the EU expands its own objectives and policy reach. This has been referred to as the “moving target” problem (Cram et al 1999, Murray and Rumford, forthcoming, 2003).

Analysts are faced with a situation where some understandings of integration are at odds with others – with resultant conflicts of meaning and understandings of EI. A clash of integrations occurs when, for example, EI as a model is not necessarily the same as EI as experience. Further what is meant by integration also varies by actor; time period; policy; economics and politics. Integration has different meanings depending on the historical periods, the drivers of integration, and the results of previous attempts at integration (requiring an historical *longue duree* perspective too, as Wallace (2000) has commenced). The concept of integration is also utilised differently, depending on academic training. The influence of academic mentors and the analytical perspective can be evident in analysing what is important in the EU. W. Wallace (1991, 4) stated:

We were conscious that perspectives on "Europe" depend not only on the place where the observer stands but on the features which she is trained to identify.

A further concern is the need to explore the conceptual spaces in the analysis of the EU which are not dominated by integration analysis – the social spaces and the non-integration spaces for dialogue among disciplines and subdisciplines and the spaces to understand society as well as economy and polity.

A final challenge is the fact that the EU's policy reach is not confined to Europe and neither is it immune from forces of globalisation – and this understanding must be increasingly embedded in the study of the EU (Rumford and Murray, 2003).

So the meaning of integration can be confusing, while it has become all-encompassing of events within the EU, to the extent that integration is now devoid of any real meaning, a problem compounded by a risk of teleology. This is linked to another problem - that integration is regarded as unfinished (Murray, 2000) – a journey to an unknown destination. It is clear that EU studies have a disquieting tendency to take integration for granted (Murray and Rumford, 2003) at the very time that there is an incremental growth of EU studies. There is a serious disjuncture between conventional accounts of the EU, on the one hand, and the considerable increase in EU competences and roles in recent years.

Expanding and Contracting Integration

Integration can be seen as expanding in three ways: Enlargement, extension of reach and impact of policies and attempts to expand integration from low to high politics. The move to high from low politics sees the EI bargain as being recast – rather than a set of low politics agreements, there is an increase in high politics negotiations and merged competences or common positions on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) so that the 'bargain' is being recast – a trend seen as having commenced with the Treaties of the 1950s through the incorporation of additional policies in the Single European Act (SEA) to the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice.

Key questions that merit increased social science inquiry are: what is integration? What drives integration? What are the results of integration? What types of integration is evident in the EU? Economic, political, cultural, social? Other?

Integration is not confined to the EU, as evident in the burgeoning literature on comparative regional integration, (Hurrell 1995; Mattli, 1999; Dent 1999; McCormick

2002). Key questions that arise are: what does integration lead to? More integration? Where will or does it end? This leads to the need to understand integration as process - in a separate debate from integration as value or ideal.

Integration as leading to polity

One of the problems with the examination of the EU as a potential polity is that the EU constitutes a regional bloc whose goals are not always consistent or self-evident; whose member states do not always agree on fundamental decisions of politics and whose political role is both supranational and intergovernmental.

The opening up of debate on integration came from two sources, particularly since the early 1990s – the analysts dissatisfied with traditional integration analysis and discourse on the one hand and the public, who rejected the permissive consensus of exclusivist elitist decision-making, on the other. There is considerable opposition to the EU's current governance role within most member states' publics. Any attempt to increase such a role raises considerable problems of public accountability, responsiveness, legitimacy and acceptance within the nation state. The permissive consensus in favour of an ongoing integration project dominated by governmental elites has been considerably eroded. This permissive consensus allowed national policy makers and EU institutions to construct an "imagined community" – that is, a community imagined by the elites in a hermetically-sealed unit - not shared by common beliefs, values or norms by the citizens - of European integration which was not subjected to public debate or referendum.

Despite considerable gains from EI by the EU such as the avoidance of war within its own states; maintaining peace in Western Europe, and promoting economic integration, there is still considerable contestation of the EU's achievements. Considerable opposition is evident to a teleological assumption that the EU might constitute a European supranational state or polity. Even the EU's economic goals may have considerable negative effects, due to their neo-liberal ideology and the continued inadequacy of mechanisms for redistribution of resources. Inequality among regions and of social groups are enduring negative aspects of economic integration and the cohesion funds have not been sufficient to counter these inequalities (Amin and Tomaney, 1995).

The EU member states have engaged in a pooling of sovereignty. Some nation state functions are now EU competences. In an era of allegedly post-sovereign and

post-national politics, the EU is a new type of sovereign body, or a body made up of post-sovereign polities and post -sovereign economies. The EU therefore is a body that is regarded by some scholars as a polity, with its own distinctive new type of sovereignty and consisting to a large degree of post-sovereign nation state polities. It is a merged polity system where many political and societal aspects are not developed or formed at the EU level, yet are no longer firmly embedded in the sovereign nation state system, which has been radically transformed by both the EU and the forces of globalisation.

Conflict of Integration objectives

The EU has expanded and the role of integration, its impact and causes and the scope and reach have also altered. Has EI analysis kept pace with these developments? The EU has been concerned, and obliged, to shift its focus and its role over time, from market economics to political integration; economic and monetary union and even management of global governance. It is essential to revisit how and why this shift has occurred and how successfully the EU has dealt with this significant alteration of governance – and how successfully analysts have engaged with these developments.

Despite the primarily economic development of the EU's governance functions, there have always been different, often conflicting, priorities for the European integration project. The 1950s, which resulted in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the European Economic Community, was also the decade when political and defence cooperation initiatives were proposed, in the form of a European Defence Community and a European Political Community. The institutions which were set in place for a European Coal and Steel Community and European Economic Community were limited in governance scope.¹ Soon, they were in crisis or defined by their institutional *lourdeur* and inertia especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, not least due to the unwillingness of nation states to relinquish more national sovereignty to incipient supranational governance.

Nevertheless, the integration objective, as expressed in the term “European Union” remained a key element of the EC’s development. The Paris Summit of the enlarged Community, 20 October 1972, stated:

¹ The High Authority of the ECSC was envisaged as a supranational institution, however.

The Member States of the Community, the driving wheels of European construction, declare their intention of converting their entire relationship into a European Union before the end of this decade.²

The Heads of States and Government have assigned themselves the key objective of converting, before the end of this decade, and in absolute conformity with the signed Treaties, all the relationships between Member States into a European Union.

This essentially politically transformative aspect of the re-organisation of interstate relations is an essential element of much EI discourse. What is increasingly necessary is a re-examination of the nature and character of the EU as a political organisation. This would commence with an examination of the original objectives of the EC. This paper argues that the original aims of the Community of the 1950s have limited current relevance for several reasons. Firstly, many of the original goals have been achieved, such as the economic objectives of a Common Market, near completion of the Single Internal Market and the Common External Tariff. Secondly, the original goals have limited impact as a generation of EU citizens have no direct experience of war comparable to the World Wars, and cannot relate to the original aims of the EC in the same manner as their parents might have. Duverger (1997, 139) refers to integration as a process that dominates today's collective and personal memories in Europe – although this may well be generational.

Thirdly, the post-Cold War era is one of marked international change, whereby the familiar stability of economic progress and of conference diplomacy engaged in by the EU have been overtaken by globalisation and increasingly transnational trade flows and international governance debates, many of which have been managed or steered by the EU itself. The EU's foreign policy and defence role are under scrutiny, at the same time as the deep internal division regarding war in Iraq are evident, with the increased awareness that the diplomacy of intergovernmentalism and cooperation on sanctions are no longer adequate to deal with international conflict. The original goals of economic prosperity and social progress are increasingly complemented by other policy areas.

For much of the 1990s, the EU's leaders responded to external factors over which the EU had little initial control - and which undermined the teleology of progress to the

² Bulletin European Community, 10/72, reproduced in European Parliament: Committee on Institutional Affairs: *Selection of Texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 to 1982*, Luxembourg, 1982, p. 241.

Single Market as the principle objective for the early 1990s! The end of the Cold War led to a transformation of much of Europe; the launch of new aid and reconstruction initiatives such as the PHARE and accelerated Enlargement negotiations. The end of the Cold War and the signature of the Maastricht Treaty signalled a new phase in EI – and the end of the "Messina to Maastricht" process, as the EU had a new post-Cold War agenda. The original EI aims were also given a jolt as a large proportion of the French, the original co-founders of the EC, rejected the aims of an ever closer union in the Maastricht referendum in 1992. One analyst regarded the narrow vote in favour of Maastricht in France as "a humiliation of itself for the founding spirit of the dream".³

Protest and questioning of the EU's current objectives have become increasingly common – some as protests against globalisation and some against increased integration. This leads to the proposal that the study of the EU should increasingly comprehend protest, transformation and identity cleavages more than hitherto.

Conflict regarding integration's end point: the problem of the journey to an unknown destination

While there was remarkable agreement among scholars and many EU institutional actors regarding the need to further advance the European integration project, there remained considerable disagreement about what its governance or status is. The EC/EU has been regarded alternatively as an organisation of states, and hence characterised by an intergovernmental framework, or as potentially supranationalist, on the other hand, with the potential to become a European government (Pinder 1995; Neunreither 2000). Others suggested that, while interdependent, it is nevertheless the nation state which is the key concern and which determines the extent to which the state is integrated into the EU. These often contradictory approaches were in part due to the fact that scholars of European integration have often become normatively involved in the EC/EU and its actions. Not all scholars have striven to be neutral observers or detached analysts. Debates have tended to discuss means to improve the EU or to couch discussion in terms of how the EU might progress in order to 'catch up' in its democratic process, for example (McKay, 1999, 125). Discourse had a normative quality and it was often a debate internal to the EU itself – comparison was rare,

³ Guardian Weekly: "The Nature of the project is changing" 4 Oct 1992, p.14.

interaction with colleagues in the social sciences who were not EU specialists was often rare too. A ghettoization (Sbragia, 1993) and a hermetic approach to EI analysis (Murray, 2000) has often been evident, with inadequate relationships with the rest of political and other social sciences. It may sound strange to suggest that the study of an entity as large as the EU has been parochial, yet established theoretical approaches had that element.

In 1989 AJR Groom (1989) referred to what he saw as a case of collective amnesia in Australia, among otherwise well-informed elites, regarding the EU- that amnesia has also been in part evident on the part of the EU regarding Australia, also (Murray, 1999, 2000). Is there a collective amnesia also evident in EU studies regarding the rest of the world – a ghettoization or compartmentalisation of EU studies from the rest of the social sciences?

Recognition of these problems led to fresh debates on the need for a more profound study of the EU's political system. There has been some questioning of the fact that EI is the stated objective of the EU, to which all events are subsumed (Murray and Rumford, 2003). There is increased recognition of the need to avoid phoney wars among theorists of the EU (Peterson, 2001: 313) and to step back from the tendency for EI specialists to advance a club-speak of experts talking to each other in what to other intelligent social scientists appears as incomprehensible jargon.⁴ There is no room for sterile debates on the nature of the EU institutions and their "federal or confederal character, debates which have poisoned discussion on European integration since Churchill's famous speech in 1946" (Duverger, 1997, 142).

In addition, the alleged need for a polity, called "EU", was accepted without questioning, as the EC's ultimate, if ill-defined aim. The EC goals of increased integration, the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or a Common Foreign and Security Policy were foregrounded as "logical" consequences of earlier attempts at integration. A problem in discussing integration as goal is that there is no agreed consensus on what the final state or end state would be. That in itself is not a problem – rather, the problem arises when the shape of an end state or EU polity is assumed or taken as given, in particular in normative or polemic accounts.

Moreau Defarges (1985, 5) suggested that, for the founders of the ECSC in the 1950s, the goal and methods of European construction were clearly defined: building a

⁴ The publication of a book on the EC by Duasan Sidjanski's in the early 1990s led Quermonns to state that that in order to read it one needed to accept the federalist approach.

federation, a United States of Europe, by the multiplicity of inter-dependencies. Writing in 1985, he posited that the EC's three aims had been both half reached and half altered as, firstly, the integrated area was not fully transparent, secondly, it has not an efficient industrial system and, thirdly, it had little legitimacy. This changing agenda of integration has been a characteristic of EI since the EU's inception.

Three issues are pertinent: firstly that the term European (Political) Union – like integration - is imprecise, although it possess some identifiable features in EU discourse that constitute it; secondly that EPU has not been achieved, although it remains a goal of EI, and thirdly the realisation of EI continues to constitute a threat to the nation state.

Analysis of and discourse on EU ideals – or EI - is the subject of decisions that will be made in the future, symbolic of the "promissory" nature of the EC (Coombes, 1993). EI is both an intrinsic element of federalist and Commission rhetoric and an agenda for the future, thereby rendering integration both ideal and promise – with a lack of clarity regarding its connotation and implications.

This perception is not new: Bieber, Jacque and Weiler (1985, 7), in their analysis of the Spinelli draft treaty on European Union saw this clearly:

“The term European Union is delightfully ambiguous; it has been used as the ideological underpinning and justification for almost all proposals designed to forward the process of European integration. The most disparate visions and strategies - the draft Act for European Union (the Genscher-Colombo proposal) on the one hand and the Draft Treaty itself on the other, to give but two recent examples - make reference to European Union. Empirically one might as well abandon any hope of arriving at a common meaning of the term”.

The term EU, as utilised in the pre-Maastricht era, was both an ideal type (Bieber et al, 1985, 7) and something that covered a multitude of structures and modalities changing over time – which meant that it did not have “a single authentic meaning” (Bieber et al, 1985, 8). This ideal of integration as expressed in the literature in favour of “EU” encompassed: an aspiration for a constitutional governance or government; democratic institutions, increased use of majority voting in the Council; joint legislative and budgetary (co-decision) powers of the European Parliament and Council; common foreign and security policy; economic and monetary union; subsidiarity and European citizenship.

Wallace illustrates that what he calls the unilinear assumptions about European integration have altered immeasurably and that European unification has achieved no final form (p. 2). This highlights the requirement for contemporary analysts of the EU to reassess European Integration objectives, utilising a broader conceptual space. This requires a shift beyond statements with elements of teleology, such as :

“European unification does not make me sad. I do not join those post-Maastricht mourners. Political union will come about; it is only a matter of time; 25, 30 years”⁵.

Clash of integration with the nation state

Ten years ago, a European Parliament Committee Report suggested that direct conflicts between national interests and Community interests were not straightforward as the member states are "usually careful not to jeopardise at least openly the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties" (Newton Dunn, 1993, 8). Further, the state's prerogative as the final arbiter in law and policy has been transformed by the European Community.

An examination of EI objectives reveals that objective of EI as European (Political) Union has a Janus-like quality - it constitutes both a promise and threat, a promise of some form of EU supranational "federalism" and a threat to the sovereignty of the nation state.

The promotion of integration, as expressed by the objective of a “European Union” featured in a number of initiatives since the 1950s, all of which had a goal to transcend the nation state. For example, the Fouchet Plan of 1961, for political unification of the founding members of the Community, called for a political charter for the union of the peoples of Europe, which encountered resistance among some member states. The 1969 Hague Summit had the aim of completing the transition to common market, the strengthening of initial plans for EMU and the enlargement of the Community's membership. The Davignon Report was the basis for the establishment of harmonisation of foreign policies, known in the Community as European Political Cooperation. The Paris Summit of 1972 set out the goal of EU by the end of the 1970s. The 1975 Tindemans report proposed a federalist constitution for the Community, for Union to be built gradually, strengthening the institutions and creating a Community

⁵ Sicco Mansholt, former EC Commissioner, NCR Handelsblad, 12 June 1993, quoted in Eurinfo, newsletter of the Brussels Office of the EC Commission, no. 178, September 1993.

foreign policy. This was largely rejected at the Hague Summit of 1976, due to "irreconcilable fundamental differences between the Member States on the constitutional structure and institutional reforms that were needed" (Borchardt, 1989, 71). Tindemans had envisaged a Union in a federal Europe, with common institutions to which a degree of sovereignty would be transferred.

Since the de Gasperi proposal for a European Political Community to complement the proposed European Defence Community in the early 1950s, was seen as "an attack upon the core issues of national sovereignty" and was never ratified (Wallace, 1983, 2), a series of initiatives for increased integration have been regarded as overambitious (Borchardt, 1989, p. 14). The history of the EC's failed initiatives for increased integration did not reflect political realities, as evidenced by, for example, the negative reception given to the Tindemans report on EU in 1976. Nevertheless, the ideal of integration survived and has been advanced in a number of guises ever since.

Clash of integration analyses

What are the arguments in favour of a reassessment of integration and EI theory and a redressing of the problems of terminology? Hitherto, integration has been discussed in a large amount of EU analysis in terms of what it is and what it could become.

The EU has been analysed in ways that reflected its disparate elements and historical development. The predominantly economic imperative of the Community, and its creation of a body of law, for example, were reflected in the preoccupations of EI analysts. There lurked a danger of elevating analysis to a normative theory, in suggesting solutions to the EU's governance problems that perhaps inflated the analytical tools to a status of normative ones. Analysts were also dealing with a unit of analysis, the EU, which changed membership and governance structure over time. It is not completely surprising that a predictive theory might be wrong, not least because the EC of the six original member states was substantially different in nature from the larger Community of nine, twelve or fifteen nation states. The challenges posed for analysts of the transformations of the EU has been recognised by many scholars.

Having established that integration has different meanings and does not adequately describe what the EU is and does, it is now timely to explore the conceptual spaces for EU studies. Just as the EU is analysed as a territorially bordered polity, so

too much of EI analysis is bordered by territory in the lack of comparative analysis with other political phenomena and other parts of the world and lack of a more global framework for the study of the EU (Rumford and Murray, 2003, forthcoming).

A further problem in the study of governance in the EU has been the many facets of the European Integration enterprise itself, as it reached beyond its primarily economic focus. The term integration and integration as dominant conceptual framework do not adequately capture these changes. It is necessary to find other meanings for different types of integration – different words and concepts.

It is imperative to look further afield, within a broader landscape, in political science, and with a framework of interdisciplinary perspectives. What is required is less emphasis on an all-encompassing integration of the EU and more integration of authors across disciplines and national frontiers in a spirit of synthesis. Dogan (1996, 123) refers to this as hybridisation, as implying an overlapping of segments of disciplines, a “recombination of knowledge in new specialized fields”.

Exploring and Broadening Conceptual Spaces

The questions raised by Deutsch regarding political science can be posed here, namely, what have we learnt from this large expansion of our tasks and resources? To what extent and in what directions have our preoccupations changed?⁶ How can we learn from the rest of political science and from other disciplines? What are the tasks of those who seek an understanding of the EU beyond integration? Where do we go from here? How could we fill the gaps in analysis of the EU in dialogues across specialisations? How can we avoid a mish-mash of approaches with little dialogue and attempt to bring about a merging or enriching of our conceptual spaces? It is already apparent that valuable cross-national cooperation on the study of Europe – or the many Europes – is evident in comparative politics; sociology, international relations; policy studies, globalisation studies and so too the EU must be a feature and not necessarily the dominant feature of these, as seen, for example in the activities of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR). Our research agendas can profitably be enriched by addressing the following issues.

⁶ Karl Deutsch, *Major Changes in Political Science, 1952-1977*, Publication series of the International Institute for Comparative Social Research, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, 1978, p. 1. See also, K. Deutsch, ‘Intellectual Development’, in W. G. Andrews (ed), *International Handbook of Political Science*, Westport, 1982, p. 9.

Firstly, it is important to re-issue the invitation to pursue fresh analysis through interdisciplinary studies. It has been argued (Murray and Rumford, 2003) that we require a fresh debate on the nature of European integration and on the parameters and priorities of a social science with which we attempt to understand EU developments. This would encompass an extensive structure of scholarly research, with deep and broad insights into the EU as governance, society, economy and culture. The transcending of disciplinary, conceptual and categorical boundaries will lessen the dangers of confusion and of obfuscation. It might also prevent the potential that contemporary EU studies may have to warn off bright scholars who might perceive the study of the EU as a closed shop of integrationists.

This need for academics to “roam across the lines, gaining analytical power in the process” (Wilensky, 1997, 325) will be healthy signs of an open approach of scholars to multidimensionality and multidisciplinary. Rosamond’s suggestion that the theorization of EI is only fully understood with reference to wider currents in political science (2000: 186) can be placed alongside Bellier and Wilson’s (2000: 1) proposals for increased engagement among, and understanding of, cognate disciplines, such as anthropology. While it is accepted that what matters is not how well theory may fit reality (Rosamond, 2000, 191) but the extent to which scholars are reflective in their own assumptions and the rigorous nature of their theorising, it is also worthy of emphasis to note that such reflectiveness should be open to challenge, to traversing boundaries in a scholarly public space of transnational discourse on and to interaction with other dialogues.

Part of a broader, or global, framework is the recognition that the perception of the EU as a territorially-bordered polity has distinct limitations and does not reflect contemporary developments. There is, for example, a need to examine the distinguishing characteristics of the EU that render it a challenging interlocutor for third countries. It is increasingly recognised by non-EU states, that, in order to negotiate with the EU in an efficient and beneficial manner, it is essential that it be understood in its macro-regional context, as a major regional actor and a distinctive regional bloc. The external implications of integration and of the EU’s global role require analysis within a global framework which is interdisciplinary.

A further aspect of the EU’s international role is the desire of an increasing number of analysts to understand better the EU as a model of integration. Equally pertinent is the need to understand the externalities of the EU’s process of regional

integration – the impact of the EU’s regionalisation on other regionalising parts of the world – and those which are not part of a regional arrangement - and the role of inter-regional relations. The impact of the EU’s integration and of Europeanisation on the nation states of the EU has been the subject of considerable debate and analysis, and it is commonly accepted that the EU’s processes have indisputably resulted in some alteration, adaptation and adjustment in the member states (Sbragia, 1994; Murray 1998; Green Cowles, et al eds. 2001) – what is often under dispute is the nature of such transformation and impact (Milward 1992). Considerably less attention has been accorded to the impact of Europeanisation on non-EU states, especially those further afield than applicant states. More analysis is required to focus on Europeanisation’s international, extra-territorial impact on non-EU countries, which might be termed New Regional Bilateralism (Murray, 2003a).

Clash of integration models

Secondly, just as the term is over-used within EU analysis, there is a danger that this tendency will be replicated in non-EU contexts too, as the EU is often admired – or derided – as a model of regional integration. A further, worrying aspect of this issue of the EU as a model is the self-conscious efforts by EU actors to advance the EU as a model not just of economic integration but also as a European Social model and as the manager of globalisation and prototypical example of good governance – both global governance and EU governance norms and values.)

This paper argues that just as international relations have changed substantially with the end of the bipolar world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the further changes after Sept 11, 2001, so too, there is a new international relations agenda, as new security agenda and an internationalising and globalisation of issues which go beyond territorial boundaries, regional blocs and individuals nation state’s interests. For this reason, the internationalisation and increased recognition of the transnational elements of issues of immigration; refugees; security; the environment and climate change, all point to the need to firstly, recognise the limitations of the nation state and, secondly the need to recognise the danger of subsuming all these issues under the heading of integration. Although linked with integration, there is a broader engagement in multilateral negotiations and dialogues that fall beyond and outside the scope of both narrow understanding of integration and of state to state diplomacy: they may be bloc-

to-bloc (as regional actors) or state-to-bloc (particularly if the EU is the bloc) or interest grouping to bloc, (such as the Cairns groups in GATT and the WTO) in multilateral fora such as the WTO and UN.

Recently, it has been argued (Higgott 1994; Langhammer 1999; Dieter 2001) that the experiences of European integration may hold some pertinence to other regions such as the Asia Pacific region. It has been argued that the experience of the EU could usefully be examined as an empirical and theoretical model of analysis for other geographical areas. There are several reasons for the examination of this European Integration “model”. Firstly, the EU is a successful regional trading bloc, the largest trading entity in the world. Secondly, it is the most advanced regional model globally in both trade and political terms. Thirdly, it is a major player in the World Trade Organisation. Fourthly, it is perceived by many of its interlocutors as a potential threat in the guise of the protectionist ‘fortress Europe’. Lastly, it is actively involved in global agenda setting, in issues from trade to the environment. This has raised pertinent and pressing questions regarding the nature of international governance, models of ‘good governance’ and issues of accountability, legitimacy and democracy – and the EU’s role. H. Wallace (2000) argues that the EU provides a set of 'benchmarks' to distinguish between shallow and deep integration, for global comparisons, with certain core features: multiple locations of governance; multiple dimensions of integration; multiple modes of interaction; and extensive institutionalisation.

This requires careful understanding of integration and non-integration aspects of the EU’s development – yet another compelling reason for a recasting of the EU bargain in an understanding of the origins of, and changing meanings of, integration.

Recasting integration as the focus of EU studies

Rumford and I have recently argued that there is a need to develop appropriate concepts and theories with which to question and investigate the dynamics of European integration (Rumford and Murray, 2003, forthcoming). While recognising that the field has expanded in recent years, nevertheless integration remains the focus of EU studies. Along with our call for greater interdisciplinarity, we have urged more bridge-building (and conceptual borrowing) across disciplines in order to pursue creative and original social scientific research (Murray and Rumford, 2003).

The past half-century has witnessed significant transformation of international politics and of European Union goals. More recently, we have seen a transformation and questioning of theoretical approaches and categories. The subject matter of the EU has altered. Increasingly, change is an element of the study of politics and especially the study of the European Union.

Thirdly, therefore, social scientists need to examine the concepts in academic debate and EU discourse, many of which are used in a confused manner. Dogan (1996, 102) reminds us that, because a concept is not only a term, but also a notion or an idea, borrowed concepts need some adaptation to the context of a new discipline – a point that is relevant in our search to expand our conceptual boundaries in the analysis of the EU. Social scientists need to continue to provide a rigorous examination of terms such as federalism and federation (McKay, 1999; Burgess 2000; Pinder 1993); government and governance; integration and supranationalism. Some analysts failed to challenge the received view that more integration must be achieved and that the EU is on a journey towards its achievement or completion. Some political scientists writing about EI issues were motivated by an admiration of the EC and EU and hence advanced a pro-EU agenda, with little detachment.

Fourthly, we need to find means of analysing non-integration issues in Europe. We need to engage political science with other social sciences, and, for example, adopt a historical perspective – back to understanding of the EU programs and original objectives – some current analysis take the Single Market or even the Euro as their starting point without understanding of the history of integration as a programmatic ideal. Yet a rethinking of the meaning and scope of integration can be a useful tool to understanding current problems regarding the division on Iraq and why the EI bargain worked at certain times, periods, under certain times of leadership. We may well need to revisit the issue of personality in leadership such as the Franco-german relationship and the role of Tony Blair. This is particularly important for Enlargement and the Convention.

The multiplicity of views, the diversity of approaches and the widespread disagreements about Maastricht, for example, have highlighted the need to examine the governance and potential polity status of the EU. The considerable opposition to Maastricht rendered the issue both more pressing and more complex. This is particularly acute as EU goals are unclear, because the goalposts keep changing as the EU has to deal with unexpected challenges. It has often had unpredictable results of its

aims. Further, it often set out objectives that were not reflected upon in terms of the overall governance structure, but rather in a developmental or gradualistic manner. This step-by-step or building blocks approach is a characteristic of the EU method.

The EU has impact beyond its original stated market integration objectives. Caporaso (1996, 588) even suggests that “territoriality, that central constitutive principle of the Westphalian system, has been called into question” and in the case of the EU, social policy now has extra-territoriality in many cases. Majone (1996, 617) sees the “massive transfer of regulatory powers” to the European Commission, especially in the area of social regulation as going well beyond the needs of an integrated European market and suggests that this willingness of states to delegate these powers in policy-making upwards can possibly be explained as due to problems of credibility, as purely intergovernmental agreements would lack credibility. He includes the environment, consumer protection, health and safety at work, equal rights for male and female workers in this category. This was not originally envisaged in the original contract or bargain of EI. Nor was it envisaged in this way by the traditional analytical approaches, even spillover aspects of neofunctionalism. While these can be regarded as largely unexpected consequence of integration as originally understood, namely in economic and political terms, we need to understand these transformations in a manner that transcends narrow confines of EI analysis. These transformations, while piecemeal, transcend both national boundaries and the boundaries of political and economic integration. The EU also has impact beyond its territory and, in the case of globalisation, it is difficult for observers to identify when one begins and the other ends.

Fifthly, in line with interdisciplinary concerns, we need increasingly to bring society back in. Questions for a research agenda would include the following. What is the role of protest and opposition to integration (economic, political and monetary)? Further, to what extent are the EU’s main achievements peace and reconciliation? Can the EU be termed a ‘peace community’, entailing reconciliation among former enemies? (Gardner Feldman, 1999) Has this peace contributed to the EU’s legitimacy? Or is peace irrelevant? What sorts of protest or opposition to the EU are in evidence? What proposals are advanced to redress a democratic deficit? Does the EU need democracy? Does this depend on whether it is a polity or is legitimate? Is the idea of democracy linked with the EU social model? What is the nature of democratic contestation in the EU? What role is played in the rise of European civil society?

The study of the EU as a model has both benefits and pitfalls. A question with a societal context is: What are the functions that the EU is assuming in democracy promotion and the sponsorship of the European social model? Does integration-based competitiveness enable the EU to advance the European social model (regulated capitalism; social justice) as a norm for global governance? Has the decline of the so-called 'permissive consensus' in favour of elite decision making in the EU led to increased contestation of the legitimacy of the EU?

Further, integration is no longer regarded as external or foreign – it is both intrinsic to domestic politics and regarded as a useful model for other parts of the world. The EU is no longer isolated from the domestic arena – if it ever was. Increasingly the scope of the new policy interests goes beyond those domestic ministries which traditionally have to have been EU, such as agriculture, trade and finance. There is an increased process of Europeanisation of domestic politics and public administration, with the bureaucracy becoming intricately involved in and contributing to EU decision-making (Nugent, 1999, 477) and with increased societal impact.

Gaffney (1999, 130) makes the point that “An assessment of EU politics as a meeting place of partisan and ideological similarities might also configure the European arena as a site of recognition where symbolic conflicts and alliances are preludes to deeper, more real, conflicts and alliances. Such analyses push the study of the EU’s politics towards cultural theory, symbolic interaction and discourse analysis approaches.” The conceptual space and cognitive frame do not need to be determined by integration as the dependent variable or the accepted given. Integration is not simply a given, but also a question and a source of tension and contestation. Integration is an insufficient means to analyse the EU and the many Europes. There is a need to move in an interdisciplinary manner beyond the comparative politics and international relations studies of the EU, with their emphasis on the state and beyond EI studies in the analysis of the EU. EU studies potentially differs from them as it sees the state in a transforming context of EI. EU studies can have a place in studying the transforming role of the state and the role of transformative factors acting on the state, whether from an intergovernmentalist, neofunctionalist or federalist perspective while remaining open to moving beyond a state emphasis to comprehend an emphasis on society, both global and European.

Integration is important as a determining factor in transformation, but integration is not to be assumed when other issues may also have relevance. For example, ethnicity in both Western Europe and Eastern and Central Europe is an increasingly important focus of political science. To that may be added issues of identity in its many manifestations; the nature, extent, expression and representation of cleavages, at subnational, national, transnational and global levels, within and beyond territorial boundaries. It is increasingly evident that nationalism; micro-regionalism; gender; racism, sectarianism, religion, fundamentalism; democratisation; the environment; human rights; protest movements; right wing extremism; the securitization of immigration; refugees and corruption are just some issues which are pertinent in the EU, in the many Europes, and not simply in an integration context (Murray and Rumford, CEP, 2003, under review).

The scope of the EU has broadened and non-EU studies of Europe are broadening too, in a promising development. The unit of analysis is not just integration or the state and the clash is no longer that of EI versus the state but other issues such as disintegration, protest, ethnicity, for example. In addition, crossnational, transnational and transregional dialogues are increasingly features of the EU's interaction with the rest of the world such as the ASEM dialogue and the possible comparative aspects of the EU experience (Mattli 1999; Katzenstein 1996).

Conclusion

Integration increasingly needs to be problematised as a critical notion rather than being the focus of a reverential exercise pandering to the dream of European political Union. There is a need to expand the imagination of scholars of the EU. It is increasingly recognised that there is a need to tackle the tasks of rigorous research and not avoid them because it is convenient to frame discourse in the integration context. This paper suggests that increased recognition of the clash of integrations is a positive step forward for the study of the EU. A synthesis of approaches is required, in a spirit of bridge-building and conceptual openness – sharing what Goodin and Klingemann (1996, 4) refer to as methodological tool-kits in order to travel across interdisciplinary boundaries. This requires the harnessing of the extensive expertise of EU experts with the related social science disciplines to a reconceptualizing and recasting of integration

and a move beyond integration to a more societal, global, and internationally comparative approach which is interactive with the other parts of the globe and with other disciplines and subdisciplines. It is only then that we can claim as social scientists to capture the dynamics of the EU in a dynamic manner.

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